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Appellees Kevin Scheidle ("Scheidle") and Meshwerks, Inc. ("Meshwerks")
(collectively "Appellees") hereby submit their responsive brief.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Appellees agree that this Court has jurisdiction.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the appeal: Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Until August 29,2003, the appellants Brigham Agler ("Agler") and Jayme Olson
("Olson") were employed by Meshwerks. R. 453. Meshwerks is a 3D digitizing,
modeling and animation firm. R. 452. Immediately prior to submitting their resignations
from Meshwerks on the afternoon of August 29, 2003, Agler and Olson stole property
from Meshwerks, specifically Meshwerks' proprietary software tools and its inventory of
3D model files. R. 399,453, 456.
After learning of the theft, Meshwerks filed a police report against Agler and
Olson, which led to criminal charges being filed against Agler and Olson. R. 458. In
addition, Meshwerks initiated a civil action in Utah's Third Judicial District Court, Civil
No. 030921056, seeking to enjoin Agler and Olson from using the 3D model files and
proprietary software tools taken from Meshwerks in conjunction with a competing
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business newly established by Agler and Olson, 3D Recon, LLC ("3D Recon"). R. 401.
In consideration for Agler and Olson's representation that they destroyed all of the files
that they took from Meshwerks, Meshwerks dismissed the civil litigation against Agler
and Olson. Subsequently the criminal charges were dropped. R. 401.
Upon dismissal of the criminal charges and the civil case, Agler and Olson filed
suit against Meshwerks and Scheidle alleging malicious prosecution by filing the police
report, and abuse of process by proceeding with a civil lawsuit. On March 6,2006, the
Court granted Meshwerks and Scheidle's motion for summary judgment dismissing Agler
and Olson's claims, and denied Agler and Olson's Rule 56(f) motion. This appeal
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Meshwerks hereby sets forth those facts that were both material to the legal
conclusions of the trial court and uncontroverted either by admission, or by Agler and
Olson's failure to introduce contrary admissible evidence:
1.

Meshwerks is a 3D digitizing, modeling, and animation firm. R. 452.

2.

Meshwerks maintains an inventory of 3D models representing 3D model

files of objects, especially automobiles. R. 452.
3.
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Meshwerks' inventory includes the following digitized vehicles:

2

1993 Mazda RX7
2003 Nissan 350Z
2003 Mitsubishi Lancer EVO
2003VWGolfGTI2door
2003VWGolfGTI4door
2004 Honda Element
2004 Jaguar S Type R
2003 Infiniti G35
R. 399,452.
4.

Prior to August 29,2003, Agler and Olson were employed by Meshwerks.

On that date, they advised Scheidle they were terminating their employment with
Meshwerks. R. 453.
5.

Prior to August 29,2003, Agler and Olson had already decided to join

together to create a new company to compete with Meshwerks. R. 453. l
6.

Agler and Olson were aware that Meshwerks considered its 3D model files

to be proprietary. R. 453.
7.

On August 28,2003, one day before announcing his decision to leave

Meshwerks, Agler took a blank CD and proceeded to make copies of Meshwerks'

1

Below, Agler and Olson denied this allegation, "in part," for the reason that they did
not formally "create" or "form" the company until after they left. Regardless of when the
Appellants went through the formal process of incorporating their competing business
enterprise, for purposes of this action, it is undisputed that Agler and Olson left
Meshwerks with the intent to form their own competing business.
752913vl
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inventory of digitized 3D model files, including specifically the 3D model files for the
vehicles identified in paragraph 2 above. R. 399, 453.2
8.

Agler copied the 3D models without the permission, consent, or knowledge

of Meshwerks. R. 399,454. 3
9.

In order to convert scanned data images of an object into a digitized 3D

model, Meshwerks employees would utilize a software program, MAYA. R. 454.
10.

MAYA can be enhanced, to make the process more productive for the

modeler by the use of pre-programmed scripts, which are referred to as "tools." R. 400.4
2

Although Agler and Olson denied the allegation below, R. 453, their denial was not
only unsupported by the record, but was contradicted by Agler and Olson's responsive
memorandum, R. 453, as well as Agler's sworn testimony (R. 227 Transcript Preliminary
Injunction Hearing Dated March 8, 2004 ("Transcript"), pp. 137-138. In his affidavit,
Agler acknowledged that "[i]mmediately before leaving Meshwerks, I copied the 3D
models that I had made at Meshwerks on my own CD (not Meshwerks' CD) for my own
portfolio." R. 493. While a cursory reading of the affidavit might lead one to presume
that Agler only copied the 3D model files that he had made, Agler made no such limiting
statement.
3

Although Agler and Olson denied the allegation below, they did so without offering
any supporting affidavit testimony. Moreover, the bald denial contradicts the record,
which reflects that Agler acknowledged having copied the models without the consent of
Meshwerks. R. 227, Transcript, p. 138.
4

Below, Agler and Olson denied this allegation. R. 454. However, the record reflects
that this denial was more a matter of semantics by which Agler and Olson self-servingly
disputed the value and functionality of Meshwerks' package of customized tools. (See,
e.g.. Agler affidavit ("Scheidle claims I stole 'tools' from Meshwerks. However, the fact
is that Meshwerks' 'tools' were unfinished before I left (and they did not work properly).
Instead I bought similar 'tools' for approximately $50 (called a 'plug-in'; see further
(continued...)
752913vl
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11.

In June 2003 Meshwerks hired Daniel Staten ("Staten"), a recent BYU

graduate with a degree in computer sciences. R. 455.
12.

During the summer of 2003, Staten's primary role was to write a custom

package of tools for use with MAYA. R. 400.5
13.

Meshwerks considered the tools to be proprietary, and at Scheidle directive,

Staten embedded into the tools the statement "Property of Meshwerks, Inc." R. 440,
R.453.
14.

On Friday, August 29,2003, at 12:22 p.m., the same day he quit working

for Meshwerks, Olson, from his Meshwerks' computer, converted the most recent
reiteration of the custom tools into a zip file, and attached the zip file to an e-mail sent to
"jaragabaro@attbi.com." R. 456.
15.

jaragabaro@attbi .com is an e-mail address owned by Olson's wife. R. 456.

16.

Olson then deleted the e-mail from his out box. R. 456-7.

4

(...continued)
below) and used said tools which worked much better than Meshwerks'.")) R. 492-3.
5

Below, Appellants denied this allegation. R. 455. However, as neither Agler nor
Olson were officers of Meshwerks, they offered no foundational basis to support their
conclusory opinions. Moreover, this denial is contradicted by Olson in his affidavit,
when he ties Staten's job to the completion of the tools. ("I e-mailed them home to help
Staten and (sic) because I was worried that if Staten was not making progress in his
projects at Meshwerks, he would be fired. Thus I had hoped to help him with the 'tools'
in question.") R. 488.
752913vl
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17.

Olson sent the tools offsite without the knowledge and consent of

Meshwerks. R.400. 6
18.

Immediately upon discovery that Appellants had copied Meshwerks'

inventory of 3D models and its customized tools, Scheidle called the police department to
report the theft and then later filed a criminal complaint. R. 458.
19.

In addition, Meshwerks filed a civil lawsuit against Agler and Olson

seeking to enjoin them from using the property they took from Meshwerks in their
business venture. R. 401.
20.

Meshwerks agreed to dismiss the civil complaint against Agler and Olson

upon the express condition of receiving written assurance from them that they had
returned and delivered to Meshwerks all files and records, including electronic files and
images which they acquired or received from Meshwerks, and that they had not retained
copies of any such files or records. R. 401,448, Scheidle Aff., Exhibit C.7

6

Below Agler and Olson denied the allegation. R. 457. However, the denial is not
supported by the record, and contradicted Olson's prior testimony whereby Agler was
forced to admit he did not request or receive permission to take a copy of the tools.
R. 227, Transcript, p. 386.
7

Below, Agler and Olson denied the allegation. However, the denial was unsupported
by admissible evidence. R. 458.
752913vl
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Below, the trial court dismissed Agler and Olson's claims for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process on summary judgment. In order to sustain a cause of
action for malicious prosecution, it is necessary for Agler and Olson to show that, in
filing the police report, Meshwerks acted without probable cause, and with malicious
intent. Contrary to Agler and Olson's contention, ascertaining whether probable cause
exists is not an inherently factual exercise, but requires the application of an objective
standard. Here, the only undisputed materials facts needed to support afindingof
probable cause are that (1) on the eve of their departure from Meshwerks; (2) Agler and
Olson took property of Meshwerks, R. 453,456; (3) which they knew Meshwerks
considered to be proprietary, R. 453; (4) without the knowledge or consent of Meshwerks,
R. 399,400,454.
In addition, Agler and Olson have failed to present any facts which would show
that Meshwerks acted with malicious intent. The facts presented to the trial court and
preserved on the record cannot support any conclusion, other than that Meshwerks filed
the police report to preserve what it considered to be its proprietary business property.
There is simply no evidence that Meshwerks acted for reasons of spite or ill will.
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Likewise, Agler and Olson's claim for abuse of process fails as a matter of law.
Meshwerks initiated the civil action in order to preserve and recover its proprietary
property. Again, Agler and Olson cannot identify any specific fact which would support a
finding that Meshwerks acted for any reason other than to protect its proprietary business
interest.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Agler and Olson's
Rule 56(f) motion. Although Agler and Olson filed the motion in November 2005, the
motion came on for consideration on March 6,2006, well over a month after the
discovery cutoff had passed. The trial court was therefore well within its discretion to
conclude that either Agler and Olson's stated need for additional discovery was
disingenuous, or that Agler and Olson had been dilatory.
ARGUMENT
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Utah law recognizes that a motion for summary judgment is proper when the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Norton
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). Citing Supreme Court decisions in support
of its refinement of the summary judgment standard in Utah, the Utah Court of Appeals in
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987) made it
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very clear that in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must also "take
into consideration the eventual standard of proof, at trial on the merits, on each element of
a plaintiffs claim." Id- at 264 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317 (1986) and
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). In Celotex. the Supreme Court
emphasized that summary judgment is "properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
short cut, but rather as an integral part" of the American system of justice which must be
available to protect against those asserting the factually unsupported claims. 477 U.S. at
327.
In attempting to challenge the trial court's ruling, the Agler and Olson raise a
number of factual issues which they assert were undisputed. The Supreme Court in
Anderson observed that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute . . . will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis
in original). The standard for summary judgment is whether or not there are any genuine
issues of material fact which would be sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the non-moving party. The Court in Anderson reiterated:
Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a jury merely
because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden
of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant
the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party. Formerly it was held that
if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the
judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high
752913vl
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authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before
the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge,
not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon
which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party
producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.
Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
n.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' CLAIM
FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
A.

Elements Required to Establish a Cause of Action for Malicious
Prosecution.

The Utah Supreme Court in Hodges v. Gibson Products Company. 811 P.2d 151
(Utah 1991), outlined the elements of tort of malicious prosecution. There the Court
noted that the plaintiff would need to establish four elements:
(1) Defendants initiated or procured the initiation of criminal proceeds
against an innocent plaintiff; (2) defendants did not have probable cause to
initiate the prosecution; (3) defendants initiated the proceedings primarily
for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; and (4) the
proceedings terminated in favor of the accused.
Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
Appellants take the position that a claim of malicious prosecution is inherently one
that must go to a jury. That is not the case, in asserting a claim for malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff has a heavy burden to meet at trial. In a recent opinion, the Court of Appeals
for Georgia upheld the dismissal of a malicious prosecution claim on summary judgment
by the trial court. Horn v. Jay Harvey Company, 617 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. App. 2005). In
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Horn, the court noted that "to prevail plaintiff must show that the defendant acted
maliciously and without probable cause. And summary judgment is appropriate where
the defendant's actions fail to satisfy either of these elements." IdL at 649. In the present
case, based on the undisputed material facts presented to the trial court, the trial court
properly dismissed the lawsuit for the reason that the Appellants have no basis, as a
matter of law, to show that Meshwerks acted either maliciously, or without probable
cause.
B.

Agler and Olson Have Failed to Show Meshwerks Acted Without
Probable Cause When It Reported the Theft of the 3D Models and
Custom Tools,

In a criminal action, the Utah Supreme Court looked to the decisional authority of
the United States Supreme Court to define "probable cause" as "'facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the subject has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'" State v. Trane. 57
P.2d 1052 (Utah 2002) (quoting Michigan v. deFillippo. 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)).
In the context of a civil malicious prosecution claim the court in Horn, noted that
the relevant question presented to the trial court was:
The question is, not whether plaintiff was guilty, but whether defendants
had reasonable cause to so believe — whether the circumstances were such
as to create in the mind of defendants a reasonable belief that there was
probable cause for the arrest and prosecution. Probable cause is defined to
752913vl
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be the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief
in a reasonable mind, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was arrested and prosecuted
Conversely '[ljack of probable
cause shall exist when the circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable
man that the accuser had no grounds for proceeding but his desire to injure
the accused.'... Generally it is for the jury to decide whether probable
cause exists, but where, as in this case, the underlying facts are undisputed,
the issue is properly before the court.
617 S.E.2d at 649 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here the undisputed material facts reflect that (1) on the eve of their departure
from Meshwerks; (2) Agler and Olson took property of Meshwerks; (3) which they knew
Meshwerks considered to be proprietary; (4) without the knowledge or consent of
Meshwerks. These four facts alone, support the trial court's conclusion that Meshwerks
had probable cause, as a matter of law, to report a theft to the police department.
With regard to Agler, Meshwerks reported a theft, when a review of Agler's
company issued laptop following Agler's departure led Meshwerks to discover that on the
day before he quit, Agler had copied Meshwerks' inventory of 3D models. The contents
of the CD that Agler had burnt on August 28, 2003, one day before he announced his
departure, was listed in detail to the trial court and consisted of 1,170 separate files.
R. 407-432.
With regard to Olson, Meshwerks reported the theft, after a review of the
electronic paper trail reflected that on the same afternoon he left Meshwerks, he created a
compressed file consisting of Meshwerks' current version of its custom package of
7529!3vl
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software tools, sent that compressed file to his wife's e-mail address, and then covered his
tracks by deleting the e-mail from his out box.
Notably, in their opening brief, Agler and Olson cannot and do not dispute that
they took the property in question. Agler and Olson cannot and do not dispute that they
took the property without asking Meshwerks for permission to do so. In short, Agler and
Olson do not have any evidence to support a claim that Meshwerks did not have probable
cause to report a theft of company property. Instead, in their opening brief, Agler and
Olson seek to introduce as disputed facts, facts which even if resolved in their favor,
would have no bearing on the legal determination of whether Meshwerks had probable
cause.
Specifically, Agler and Olson contend the following disputed facts are relevant and
material on the issue of probable cause:
1.
"Scheidle knew that Agler and Olson continually took files, preferences,
tools, models, etc.. home with them so that they could work on Meshwerks' projects
outside the office." (Brief of Appellants, p. 8)
This factual allegation is immaterial to the dispute at hand. The actions of Agler
and Olson which gave rise to the filing of a police report (and the initiation of the civil
action) were not routine actions undertaken by an employee in furtherance of their
employment with Meshwerks. With regard to the 3D models, the mere fact that during
the course of his employment, on occasion, Agler worked at home on a 3D model, which
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was a work in process, does not support a reasonable inference by a finder of fact that
Agler therefore had an open invitation to copy Meshwerks' entire inventory of completed
3D models upon his departure from the company.
Additionally,, the allegation is deliberately misleading. While informing the court
that he worked on Meshwerks 3D models at home, Agler fails to note that he was
provided with a company laptop, which he was required to leave with the company when
he departed. It was upon review of his laptop that Scheidle discovered that Agler had
copied Meshwerks5 inventory of 3D models. R. 227, Transcript, p. 36.
Similarly, Olson's action in sending the most recent version of Meshwerks'
custom tools on the same afternoon he left the company, is not explained, justified, or
excused by actions that Olson had previously taken while acting as an employee of
Meshwerks, to serve the business purpose of Meshwerks.
2.
"Scheidle's own conduct in maintaining files on his own personal computer
which he had created at his previous place of employment implied that such conduct as
acceptable to him." (Brief of Appellants, pp. 8-9.)
This allegation represents an unsubstantiated attempt by Agler and Olson to poison
the well. Notably, Agler and Olson below do not introduce any admissible evidence to
support their bald allegation that Scheidle took the 3D model files from his prior place of
employment, Viewpoint, upon his departure. The trial court was therefore free to
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disregard this allegation. More importantly, even if true, Agler and Olson offer no
evidence below that this occurred without the consent of Viewpoint.
3.
"Knowing that Agler and Olson had taken many Meshwerks files home
with them, and even approved of Agler taking his preferences and models from
Meshwerks the day he left. Scheidle never expressed disapproval of such practice, or
instructed them to return said items until after they had left Meshwerks." (Brief of
Appellant, p. 9.)
This allegation, which began as a red herring below, has now evolved into a fully
unsupported statement of fact. In the trial court, Agler and Olson asserted that
Meshwerks gave Agler permissions to copy his "preferences." R. 493. The disputed fact
when presented to the trial court was a red herring. This case has nothing to do with
Agler or Olson copying their "preferences." Meshwerks does not and has not ever
asserted a proprietary interest in Agler or Olson's "preferences." Preferences are
computer settings which allow the software user to personalize the program; here,
MAYA. In the record below, Agler explained what he meant by preferences:
Q. (Mr. Romero). . . . You tell me what a preference is.
A. (Agler) Well, the preferences that I'm referring to would have
been my Maya preferences, which any time you go to any particular set of
May, or Maya can be installed - on any computer, butyou kind of cater the
environment, I guess, or the process that you generate work around, so, for
instance, I have hot keys that did particular functions within a program.
And so it was standard practice anyway. If you were to leave a company
and go to another you could take your preferences with you.
Q. Right. And I'm family with like word processing, I have
preferences built-in like font size, margin widths?
752913vl
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A. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.
Q. Whether Pm going to view it in 75 percent of page, is that what
you refer to, "preferences," when it comes to Maya? Things that are
tailored to your own use of the Program?
A. Yeah - yeah, I guess.
R. 47, Deposition of Brigham Agler ("Agler Depo") dated July 7,2004, pp. 25-26.
Agler and Olson seek to mislead the court by conflating "preferences," which
Meshwerks does not consider proprietary, with the 3D models and custom tools. Thus,
while there is support in the record for the disputed contention that Agler had permission
to copy his "preferences" on the day he left, R. 464, there is no support in the record for
Agler and Olson to now claim as alleged on page 9 of their brief, that Meshwerks
"approved of Agler taking his preferences and models from Meshwerks the day he
left

" By contrast, the fact that Scheidle had asked Agler if he wanted to copy his

preferences before turning over the company laptop, but not inviting Agler to copy
Meshwerks5 inventory of 3D models, or the office's current version of custom tools,
conclusively proves that Agler and Olson had no such implied consent.
4.
"Scheidle understood that neither he nor his company owned the models in
question, and that the scripts and preferences were not proprietary." (Brief of Appellants,

Putting aside Agler and Olson's reference to the "preferences," this allegation is
made without any support in the record. The undisputed facts in the record show that
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Meshwerks considered both the 3D models, which Meshwerks advertised for resale, and
the package of customized tools, which contained the embedded statement "Property of
Meshwerks" to be proprietary. R. 400. Moreover, contrary to the present assertion, the
record shows that both Agler and Olson knew that Meshwerks considered both the 3D
models and tools to be proprietary. R. 453,456.
5.
"The scripts in question were not even finished when Agler and Olson left
Meshwerks." (Brief of Appellants, p. 9.)
Here, this allegation is not only misleading, but it is wholly irrelevant. By using
the term "finished" it appears that Agler and Olson would have this Court believe that the
tools were not functional. This conclusion is not supported by the record. To the
contrary, when asked if the tools had been "completed" by the time Agler and Olson left
on August 29, Mr. Scheidle testified as follows:
"I would say that they were - this is the kind of thing that's like never really
completed. We always refining and adding new functionality features to it,
you know, up until today even, and I would say that 90 to 95 percent of the
functionality that we were looking for the specific task was taken care of at
that time. We were using the tool on daily basis to perform our work."
R. 227, Transcript, p. 26.
In contrast to Agler and Olson's self-serving statements that the tools had no value
prior to their departure, before they were caught stealing the tools, Agler and Olson stated
otherwise. Specifically, the record reflects that Mr. Staten testified that Agler and Olson
both expressed their ongoing interest in the tools.
752913vl
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Q. (Mr. Romero) Did Mr. Agler and Olson ever comment on the
quality of the tools?
A. (Staten) Yes.
Q. What did they tell you?
A. They told me on several occasions that the tools were awesome.
They told me that I was, in their words, a prodigy, and that these tools were
making a huge difference in their work.
R. 227, Transcript, p. 106.
In any event, the allegation is wholly immaterial. Even assuming the tools
themselves were still a work in process, and had no value until further work was
completed, Meshwerks had every right as a business owner to protect its proprietary
interest in the "incomplete" package of custom tools.
6.
"[Njeither Agler nor Olson believe the models or tools at issue in this case
to be proprietary." (Brief of Appellants, p. 9.)
This disputed factual allegation is immaterial. In order for the Court to resolve the
question of probable cause, it is not necessary for this Court to determine whether Agler
and Olson subjectively believed that the models and tools they took were or were not
proprietary. The relevant question is whether, at the time it filed the police report,
Meshwerks had a reasonable basis to believe that it had a protectable property interest in
its 3D models and custom tools. Here, Meshwerks created and sold its 3D models to
customers, and it hired an employee to develop custom tools to give the company a
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competitive advantage over its competitors. R. 398-400. Notably, though presenting
their subjective belief that Meshwerks does not have a protectable proprietary interest in
the models or tools, Agler and Olson did not provide either below, or in their brief on
appeal, any legal authority to support this self-serving, subjective belief.
C.

Meshwerks Acted Without Malicious Intent,

In addition, Agler and Olson failed to introduce below any admissible facts which
would support a finding at trial that, even if Meshwerks acted without probable cause, it
also acted in bad faith in reporting what it believed to be a crime. The undisputed facts
presented below were that Meshwerks acted for a legitimate business purpose.
Meshwerks filed the police report in order to protect its proprietary interest in its 3D
models and software tools. While Agler and Olson would have this Court believe that
Meshwerks acted out of spite or malice, they failed to marshal any evidence whatsoever
which would support such a finding. Simply stated, there is no evidence that Meshwerks
filed the police report or the subsequent civil action for any reason, but for the fact that
Agler and Olson took property which Meshwerks believed to be proprietary.
Agler and Olson contend that a finder of fact could infer malicious intent based on
the fact that Scheidle filed the police report after Olson attempted to communicate with
him. Specifically, Agler and Olson allege "[a]fter being accused of theft, Olson called
Scheidle to find out what was happening. Instead of taking Olson's phone call or
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returning Olson's voicemail, Scheidle instead went straight to the police without first
finding out what Olson's story was about the alleged theft." (Brief of Appellants, p. 9.)
Once again, Agler and Olson overstate the record. The record does not support
either the fact, or the inference, that Scheidle filed a police report after the alleged phone
call by Olson. Scheidle testified that upon discovery of the theft, he called the police
department to report the theft. R. 401. By contrast, Olson, without providing a specific
date, testified only that he called Scheidle after he learned that he had been accused of
theft. R. 486. The record does not support Agler and Olson's present contention that
Scheidle reported the crime after refusing to take Olson's telephone call.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' CLAIM
FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS
In order to establish a claim for abuse of process, Agler and Olson are required to

meet two requirements:
To establish a claim for abuse of process, a claimant must
demonstrate c[f]irst, an ulterior purpose; [and] second, an act in the use of
the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding/
Anderson Development Company, L.C. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005) (citing
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 Ut App. 378, ^ 34.
The undisputed, unequivocal facts in this proceeding reflect that Meshwerks filed
the civil proceeding in order to prevent Agler and Olson from using what Meshwerks
considers its proprietary property interests. R. 401. The record further reflects that
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Meshwerks agreed to dismiss the civil action upon receiving assurance from Agler and
Olson that they had returned and destroyed all copies of the files which Meshwerks
sought to protect. R. 401. Based on the undisputed fact, the trial court had no basis
within which to infer any bad faith or malicious motive underlying Meshwerks' pursuit of
its civil action.
Moreover, Agler and Olson introduced no evidence to suggest that Meshwerks was
abusive during the course of the litigation. In fact, there is no evidence in the record to
support an allegation, inference, or even speculation that Meshwerks did anything more in
the course of the civil litigation than precisely what Meshwerks deemed to be necessary to
preserve and protect its proprietary property. There is no allegation that Meshwerks
abused its authority to issue subpoenas. There is no allegation that Meshwerks served
overbroad discovery requests. There is no allegation that Meshwerks employed any
abusive tactic in the course of the civil litigation. The trial court properly dismissed Agler
and Olson's abuse of process claim on summary judgment.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
AGLER AND OLSON'S RULE 56(f) MOTION
Agler and Olson's appeal of the trial court's order denying the Rule 56(f) motion is

flawed for two significant reasons. First, Agler and Olson's failure to order a transcript
renders a proper review of the Court's ruling impossible. The Rule 56(f) motion was
presented and argued to the trial court in open court on March 6,2006, at which time
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Agler and Olson had an opportunity to specifically identify to the Court what discovery
had taken place both in this case and in the prior civil proceeding, and what additional
discovery they believed was necessary.
Agler and Olson chose not to order and provide the appellate court with a
transcript of the hearing. The trial court has broad discretion to control its calendar, and
most certainly the representations and remarks made by counsel in open court as to their
discovery needs is critical to the court's management of the case. The discussion that
took place in court is critical to an assessment of whether the trial court abused its
discretion.
Second, Agler and Olson fail to note, let alone address the impact of the timing in
which the Rule 56(f) motion was presented. Notably, the Rule 56(f) motion was filed on
December 1,2005, and came on for hearing on March 6,2006. In the interim, the
discovery cutoff passed on January 31,2006. R. 18. In denying the motion, the Court
was within its discretion to disregard as disingenuous Agler and Olson's assertion on
December 1, 2005 that they needed additional discovery, when in fact, they not only
allowed the discovery cutoff to pass without undertaking the-discovery, but had not
sought an extension to conduct additional discovery. The Utah Supreme Court in
Crossland Savings v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994), recognized that the Court has
the discretion to deny a Rule 56(f) motion when it perceives that the party is dilatory in
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pursuit of discovery. In assessing whether the Rule 56(f) movant was dilatory, the Court
noted a relevant fact was that the movant "did not even attempt to initiate any discovery
during that time, nor did he attempt to conduct any investigation or discovery after
Crossland filed its summary judgment motion on July 28th, and no discovery request
accompanied the filing of his Rule 56(f) motion on August 6th." Here, where nearly four
months have passed between the date the underlying motion was filed and the hearing
date, the Court was well within its discretion to deny Agler and Olson's Rule 56(f)
motion.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2006.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

Jerome Romero
Attorneys for Defendants Kevin Scheidle and
Meshwerks, Inc.
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